Posts Tagged ‘dsf’

DSF Associate’s Involvement in Economic Consultation
February 4th, 2013

Florendo Llameg and Tony Clement

On January 21, 2013, an associate from Devry Smith Frank LLP, Florendo Llameg, had the privilege to attend a roundtable discussion of Canada’s economic issues at the McGregor Park Community Centre in Toronto. The invitation to the event was made by the Honourable Tony Clement, President of the Treasury Board, to members of the Toronto Philippine business community. As a member of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce – Toronto, Florendo Llameg attended the event as part of the Harper Government’s economic consultations. The local consultation was aimed at harnessing valuable input from hard-working entrepreneurs, professionals and business owners who invest, innovate and create jobs in Canada. In attendance from the government in addition to Minister Clement were Roxanne James, Member of Parliament for Scarborough Centre, and Joe Daniel, Member of Parliament for Don Valley East. The President of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce- Toronto, Oswald Tugadi had the following words in response to the roundtable invitation: “I believe that this is the first time that we, Filipino Canadians, will have an opportunity to have input in such an exercise.” Furthermore, Florendo Llameg enjoyed the opportunity to represent his local community and participate in a discussion of economic growth in Canada.


Child support does not end at age 18
January 22nd, 2013

child-support-toronto

A family law lawyer will advise you that child support in Canada does not automatically end for a child when he or she turns 18 years old unlike several jurisdictions of the United States.  In Canada, child support continues for children after their 18th birthday in one of two circumstances:

1. If the child is disabled, such that he or she remains dependent and cannot obtain employment that is adequate to meet his or her needs; or,

2. When a child is enrolled full-time in a program of education.  In theory, that program of education must be career-oriented and not just an excuse for the child to remain dependant.  There is a debate over whether a “victory lap” in high school, where a child who spends an extra year in high school, qualifies the child to continue receiving child support.  Some factors to be considered are if the child is spending that extra year to hang out with friends, or to avoid entering the workforce or postsecondary education, rather than continuing their studies to meet the educational requirements of a particular program.

An important difference in child support for children over 18 years of age is that the child support tables no longer presumptively apply (although most judges use the tables as a starting point) and other arrangements can be made for their support to suit their particular circumstances.

For children over 18 years old, who are enrolled in a full-time program of education, their educational expenses may be special or extraordinary expenses.  This means that the child’s parents must contribute to postsecondary education, tuition, books, residence, and other related expenses in proportion to their incomes.

This does not mean that children of separated parents are automatically entitled to have their entire postsecondary education paid for by their parents while their peers that have intact families have to pay for school.  Judges are supposed to consider:

  •  What arrangements would have been made for the children’s education if the family was still intact
  • What contribution the child should make to his or her own education.  The longer a child spends in school, the more that the courts expect the child to consider.  The courts expect children to apply for grants and scholarships and to incur a reasonable amount of student debt in light of the parents’ financial situation.

However, where it is not clear how these factors should impact on the amount of child support, judges err on providing support to the child.

It is common for the child support payer to pay full table amount of support while the child is at home from school and a reduced amount while away at school.  The logic behind this is that a portion of the base child support is to pay for food and accommodation, but the parents are already sharing the cost of food and accommodation as special or extraordinary expenses.  However, the recipient parent is also maintaining a home for the child to come back to, so some amount of support is appropriate to cover that expense.

Since the tables no longer presumptively apply, parents of adult dependent children are free to agree to other arrangements than the above to share the child’s expenses.  Sometimes one parent pays all of the post-secondary costs and stops paying base child support.  Sometimes the parents each agree to be responsible for specific expenses.

After a child turns 18, child support may not end, but the parents have more freedom over how they will share the child’s expenses. For further information regarding child support for children over 18, please consult a family law lawyer.


Forced to Retire Involuntarily
January 14th, 2013

IT TAKES A LONG TIME TO BECOME YOUNG – PICASSO

In a recent British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, a lawyer attempted to challenge his law firm’s mandatory retirement practices before the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal.  Mr. McCormick was a partner at Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP (“Fasken”), a limited liability partnership.  The Fasken partnership agreement provided for a mandatory retirement provision once partners, such as Mr. McCormick, turned 65.  Upon turning 65 Mr. McCormick was forced to retire involuntarily.

The central issue before the British Columbia Court of Appeal was whether a partner in a limited liability partnership is an employee of the partnership for the purpose of claiming the protection of human rights legislation against age discrimination.

The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal and a British Columbia Supreme Court chambers judge on judicial review held that for the purposes of human rights legislation, a partnership may be treated as a separate legal entity from its partners and as the employer of a partner, with the result that the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a complaint by a partner concerning discrimination in his employment.

Madam Justice Levine writing on behalf of a unanimous three-judge panel disagreed and held that the “fundamental and well-established principle of law that a partnership is not, in law, a separate legal entity from, but is a collective of, its partners, and as such, cannot, in law, be an employer of a partner.”

Mr. McCormick has filed an application for leave to appeal.

While I am inclined to agree with Justice Levine’s position I would like to canvass three additional issues.

The first issue is the comprehensive post-mandatory-retirement framework provided for in the Fasken partnership agreement.  Subject to the discretion of the managing partner, the agreement provides for transitioning equity partners to stay on board either as equity partners or in various other capacities after they reach the mandatory age of retirement.  While I do not take issue with the managing partner’s unfettered discretion to run the business and make personnel decisions that are incident thereto, I would prefer to see a mechanism in place whereby an equity partner such as Mr. McCormick may appeal the managing partner’s decision.

The second issue, which is crystallized in this case in particular, is the relative bargaining power of the parties.  In this day and age, few lawyers, or any person for that matter, can say they have spent nearly four decades working at the same place like our protagonist.  That type of tenure has both its advantages and disadvantages and I can’t help but wonder whether any additional safeguards at common law or otherwise over and above the Fasken partnership agreement should have been further explored.

The last issue I will consider is a theme borrowed from corporate law.  As many of you may know, in corporate law courts have disregarded the separate legal status of the corporation and imposed personal liability on directors, officers and shareholders where the corporation is used solely for personal benefit, this is referred to as piercing or lifting the corporate veil.  While this is an extraordinary measure that typically stems from fraud or a similar type of misconduct the underlying analytical framework should not be thrown out with the proverbial bathwater.  Indeed, while I am not suggesting that there was any wrongdoing in the instant case, I can’t help but feel as though Justice Levine’s analysis could have gone beyond the form and substance of the Fasken partnership agreement.

Share your thoughts about mandatory retirement, the differing treatment of equity partners of law firms versus officers of corporations and whether you agree with the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

 


RITE OF PASSAGE
December 11th, 2012

Recently, I had my first contested motion.   I’ll save you the suspense, I got my butt kicked.  But, as with everything else I’ve done at DSF, there was much to be learned from this experience.

The non-exhaustive list of takeaways, in no particular order, is as follows:

  1. 1.  The drive to Cobourg Superior Court is much shorter than the drive home, particularly so, after you’ve lost;
  2. 2.  A judge that asks no questions during submissions is just as challenging as a judge that asks many questions, even if that seems counter intuitive at first.  In this instance, I had the former so allow me to explain. 

As the non-moving party I had the benefit of hearing the submissions of my friend (not sure how many of you know that that’s how lawyers refer to one another before a judge, which is slightly different from the United States vernacular where lawyers refer to one another as brothers and sisters) whom I felt gave a succinct and reasonable position.  I knew it was my turn because the courtroom suddenly fell silent and the judge turned his gaze squarely toward me. 

I began by thanking my friend and submitting that my position was not remarkably different from hers, rather the difference was slight or negligible.  I thought this was important to do because I wanted the judge to feel as though a ruling in my favour could be achieved notwithstanding he accepted most of her submissions.  I then turned my attention to my main issues.  Then I rambled on about something or the other.  And then I may have rambled on some more.  My entire submission only lasted 3 or 4 minutes, but it felt like much longer than that.  And therein lays my point.  Without a judge interacting and putting questions to me, it was difficult to gauge how much time to spend on each issue, whether I should have refuted my friend’s submissions, or, most importantly, where the judge stood on any or all of the issues before him.

After briefly considering both sides, the judge decided in favour of my friend.  I was unhappy to be sure.  The worst part was that I had my whole drive home to second guess everything I had said…

Outside the courtroom I briefly stopped and chatted with my friend.  She was incredibly gracious and professional in her victory; I wish the same could be said of me….In any event, in this post’s on-again-off-again something extra segment, I would like to leave you with some words of wisdom that my friend imparted on me during our chat…she said not to worry, when she was an articling student she didn’t win a single motion, you read that correctly, not a single motion, but she assured me it would get better, you see this is all part of the rite of passage…

EG


DSF Lawyers Successful at Ontario Court of Appeal
November 30th, 2012

George O. Frank, and Maya Krishnaratne were counsel for the successful insurer in a recently released decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal relating to payment of Statutory Accident Benefits. The case involved a dispute between two insurers as to who was responsible for paying no-fault accident benefits to an injured “owner/operator” of a commercial delivery vehicle of which the owner/operator was an occupant at the time of the accident.

Pursuant to the Owner Operator agreement between the owner/operator and the transport company, the owner/operator provided a truck and driver to the transport company to deliver cargo on behalf of the transport company’s customers. Insurance coverage was placed on the truck pursuant to a “fleet policy” arranged by the transport company. Although the truck in question was listed on the fleet policy, the owner/operator was not named as an insured on the fleet policy.

The owner/operator owned a personal use vehicle which was insured pursuant to a policy which named the owner/operator as insured. The insurer on the fleet policy took the position that the injured owner/operator had to claim accident benefits from the insurer of his personal vehicle.

The court’s decision turned on the interpretation of section 66 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule. Section 66 provides that where a vehicle is provided for an individual’s regular use by a “corporation, unincorporated association, partnership, sole proprietorship or other entity”, the individual will be deemed to be a named insured on the insurance policy covering that vehicle, even if not named as an insured on the policy.

Similar situations had been addressed by several courts and arbitrators in a lengthy string of decisions. In those cases, the arbitrators and courts focused on the question whether the truck was provided for the regular use of the owner/operator by the transport company. In the majority of those cases, the answer was no – the truck was provided by the owner/operator for the transport company, not the other way around. The Court of Appeal held that these previous decisions had addressed the wrong question. The question should have been whether the owner/operator could provide the truck to himself for his own regular use. The Court held that the wording of section 66 of the Schedule was sufficiently broad to include such a situation, and that the question should be answered affirmatively. The truck was provided for the regular use of the injured owner/operator, and accordingly the owner/operator was deemed to be a named insured on the fleet policy covering the truck. The insurer on the fleet policy had to respond to the owner/operator’s claim for Statutory Accident Benefits, and the insurer of the personal vehicle did not.


Debts not released by bankruptcy – Professional Student Loans
November 22nd, 2012

One of the main purposes of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act[1] is to allow debtors in unfortunate circumstances to get a fresh start, free of their debts.  With limited exceptions, an order of discharge from bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all unsecured debts.  One of the exceptions is a student loan from the government, under the Canada Student Loans Act, the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act, or any similar provincial law.  If you borrow money from the government to fund your education, bankruptcy will not get rid of that debt and you will need to pay it back after your bankruptcy. 

There are also several court decisions[2] in support of the idea that private student loans that are used to fund professional degree educations, such as medicine, dentistry, law, chiropractic college and others, should also be repaid and not be released by discharge from bankruptcy.  Loans from banks are not considered to be the same as government student loans under the BIA, and would generally be released upon discharge.  These loans are granted as a result of business decisions of banks, rather than under provincial student loan laws.  However, the courts have found, in certain circumstances, that private student loans should be treated similarly to government student loans in a bankruptcy.

 The reasoning is essentially that, unlike other debts, a student seeks a loan from a bank to fund her education with a view to eventually graduating and earning a substantial income through her professional degree.  The bank lends funds on the expectation that it will be repaid years down the road from the professional’s higher salary.  Similarly, the student expects to graduate with a significant amount of debt owed to the bank for her education, and that she will repay that debt from her higher salary obtained through that education.  The court may not allow a student to take loans to fund a professional degree, then attempt to get out of her repayment obligations by filing for bankruptcy.

 Each case depends on its own circumstances, and to date, the BIA only recognizes government student loans in section 178(1) as a specific debt not released by order of discharge.  If the private student loan is only a small part of a long list of debts of the bankrupt, for example, a court may not treat the private student loan any differently from other debts released by order of discharge.  Creditors, such as banks and private lenders, should seek legal advice where a professional student loan is involved in a bankruptcy.  There may be options available to collect on a private student loan even in the face of a bankruptcy that can result in much higher recovery for the creditor than originally thought.

 If you have any questions regarding section 178(1) debts not released by order of discharge in a bankruptcy, please contact a lawyer in the Bankruptcy Insolvency and Recovery Practice Group at Devry Smith Frank LLP.  We advise creditors, debtors, receivers and trustees with regard to large and small restructurings, including personal and corporate bankruptcy, consumer and Division I proposals and corporate restructurings under the CCAA.


[1] R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.

[2] See, for example, Re Korenic, 2005 CanLII 28179 (ON S.C.), Re Ament, 2006 CanLII 30583 (ON S.C.) and Re Manning, 2011 ABQB 566.


Articling takes you places
November 16th, 2012

Here is a recount of an exceptional day at DSF that took me to 6 places and some 450km all in one day:

1)      Newmarket: Criminal Court Appearance

2)      Bracebridge: Commercial Real Estate Closing

3)      Barrie: Law Office

4)      Don Mills: DSF Office

5)      Liberty Village: Franchise Purchase Closing

6)      Etobicoke: Home Sweet Home

 

 


First Court Appearance
November 16th, 2012

As promised I will share with you my first court appearance.  As a summer student at the firm I observed a few court appearances with associates at the firm, however, I did not get a chance to appear before the court on my own.  So you can imagine that my first day of articles I was very excited that my time will eventually come and I would attend court all on my own.  Well that day came sooner than expected; at around noon first day of articles during a welcome lunch, one of the associates asked me to attend an assessment hearing for a small claims bank file.  I was excited, scared and surprised at the chance to attend court on the second official day of my articles.  I stayed up late reviewing small claims rules, reading our pleadings and materials and practicing my submissions.  The day at court was an amazing experience, the deputy judge was pleasant and very patient with everyone he heard before me.  I briefly summarized what I sought from the court and answered a few short follow up questions.  Before I knew it the deputy judge awarded what I sought, complimented me on attending Western Law and wished me the very best in my legal career.  I can tell you three months into articles and many more court appearances on matters ranging from contract law to insurance law, to real estate, to family and even a criminal matter I never had it as good as that first day in court. 

 


Notice Period for Termination of Employment
November 16th, 2012

Notice Period for Termination of Employment

 A recent Ontario decision, Hussain v. Suzuki Canada Ltd, awarded the plaintiff, a terminated employee, 26 months of reasonable notice for termination of his employment without cause.  This is welcome news to terminated employees because the court awarded a notice period in excess of the usual 24 month upper limit.  However, before disgruntled employees that have been recently terminated start asking for 26 month notice periods they should be aware that they still need to meet Bardal factors to even reach the assumed cap of 24 months.  Furthermore, they should be aware of the exceptional circumstances that justified the increase of notice period in Hussain.  The terminated employee in Hussain¸ worked continuously at Suzuki for almost 36 years and had no notice or even inkling of his termination.  His last position was an Assistant Warehouse Supervisor in charge of 11 other employees, a position that Suzuki acknowledged was very important and valuable.  Another key factor in the decision was the age of the plaintiff, who was almost 65 years old at the time of the termination.  Despite the exceptional facts of the case, this decision is a good precedent for employees fighting to get a fair and just award to compensate them for a wrongful dismissal.


You wrote what? Defamation in the internet age
November 8th, 2012

The internet has been described by some as a forum for righteous indignation. Many internet operators monetize their websites by operating rating sites, blogs which allow comments to be left or discussion forums. The ease in which comments may be made raises liability issues for both the writer and the websites on which such comments are made.

Defamation generally describes a communication, whether written or oral, that harms another’s reputation. A defamation of character claim generally exists where: (i) a false statement was made; (ii) the statement caused harm and; (iii) the statement was made without adequate research into the truthfulness of the statement. Various defenses do exist which are not the topic of this blog post.

Even prior to the popularity of social media sites, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Barrick Gold Corporation v. Lopehandia, recognized that defamation on the internet was distinct from traditional mediums. The speed and reach of the internet made any comments defamatory in character more easily distributed and believed.

For the purposes of this blog, we are going to concentrate on two particular issues specific to defamation as it occurs on the internet:

The risk of defending an action in another jurisdiction.

If an Ontario resident reads a defamatory comment about themselves made by someone in Florida, where should they sue? Since 2010, American law states that defamation of character judgments in foreign jurisdictions will not be recognized in American courts if they conflict with the First Amendment (freedom of speech rights). Thus, the Ontario resident would have to travel to Florida to begin an action, lest they sue in Ontario and try unsuccessfully to enforce a foreign judgment in Florida where a First Amendment defense is likely to be raised.

In Ontario, a case such as Bangoura v. Washington Post reinforces the traditional common law approach of courts assuming jurisdiction where there is a real and substantial connection with the province. For example, a defamatory comment made about an Ontario resident by a blogger in Nevada where only 2 of 2,500 readers reside in Ontario may not constitute enough of a connection to commence an action in Ontario.

Publishers Liability

Under “traditional” media, a publisher who publishes a defamatory statement will be held to be equally liable for the statements made by the author of the work as the author herself. People who distribute publications (bookstores and libraries) are generally not held to the same degree of liability. The rationale behind this distinction is that publishers have the opportunity to review the content and can remove defamatory material while distributors may not have the same opportunity. However, do we treat websites as publishers or distributors?

Canadian case law on this matter is sparse at the time of the writing of this blog. The Supreme Court of Canada in Crookes v. Newton ruled that merely hyperlinking to defamatory material does not give rise to a defamation of character claim. Hyperlinking, as a passive reference to something that exists, was differentiated from repeating a defamatory comment. Where the website is actively repeating defamatory material, the website owner would be seen as closer to a publisher than a distributor and bear the same liability as the provider of such content. As such, the Supreme Court of Canada made the distinction between permitted conduct of publishing a hyperlink versus presenting the hyperlink in a manner which repeats the defamatory conduct.

A conversation with our American colleagues indicates that American law takes a similar approach.  As we have been informed, American laws will not recognize a defamation of character claim for passively hosted third party content; but the defense is eroded if the website owner takes a more active approach to amending, editing or removing content. In other words, the more the website owner acts like a publisher, the greater its liability.

This has lead to the strange result that doing nothing as a website owner is better than doing something when it comes to defending against defamation claims.

Defamation of character is generally a complex field of law. When coupled with the online component, it becomes even more complex. As such, qualified legal advice should be sought if you are operating a website containing opinionated content.

If you have any questions regarding online defamation, please do not hesitate to contact the Intellectual Property or Business and Corporate Services department at Devry Smith Frank LLP. We have been assisting our clients grow and prosper since 1964.